Thitinan Pongsudhirak on the lingering post-referendum divisions in Thailand
By Jon Fernquest[Introduction|Vocabulary|Article]
[Reading Questions|Answers]
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Thitinan Pongsudhirak, head of Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS) at Chulalongkorn Unviersity, writes today of the unresolved issues and divisions that lie in the wake of this week's mixed referendum result.
For further reading, read political analyst Chang Noi on the political influence of Thailand's middle class, both the pressure to comply with western standards of democracy that it feels as well as the even more pressing need to get on with economic life and put the current political conflicts behind them:
"The political priority for the middle class is to maintain the economic growth which underlies rising prosperity. Increasingly, the middle class feels that requires political stability, however that is achieved. But at the same time this globalized middle class needs to feel accepted and respected in the international landscape. To gain that acceptance, the country has to appear to be a democracy as that has become the international standard...It would rather not have to choose between prosperity and democracy. It hopes to muddle through with "managed democracy" as a gift from the generals. The muddle class." (Source: Chang Noi)
Check out a map of the referendum results color-coded in blue and red at the New Mandala blog.
Reading Questions
Here are some questions to guide your reading (See answers at end):1. What did the referendum vote reveal about Thai society?
2. Why is Thai society divided and what does this division have to do with Thaksin?
3. What percentages of the vote were for and against the charter?
4. How do the anti-charter groups feel about the referendum vote?
5. What was the heartland of Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party?
What percentage of the electorate does it account for?
Did the referendum pass in this region?
6. What percentage of the electorate does the north account for?
What was the referendum vote like in the north?
7. What does the referendum vote reveal about the regional nature of Thai politics?
8. Does everyone who voted for the charter agree with the charter? Why or why not?
9. Why is it likely that General Sonthi will enter politics and try to get elected?
10. What political party has effectively replaced Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party? What percentage of the vote is it projected to get in the next election?
11. What recent period of Thai history does the post-2007 referendum period look like it will resemble?
12. What is the "triangular concentration of unelected power" under the new charter? What effect will it likely have on governance under the new charter?
13. What interests is the newly emergent democracy under the new charter likely to serve?
Bangkok Post Article August 22, 2007
ANALYSIS / THAI POLITICSPost-referendum 'custodial democracy'
For the coup-makers, the results of the referendum clearly indicate unfinished business with Thaksin ShinawatraBy THITINAN PONGSUDHIRAK
Thai voters have spoken but their voices are discordant. The telling indicator from the referendum results was not the numbers who polled in favour of the 2007 constitution, but those who turned it down.
The outcome evidently reveals a deeply polarised country, just as it has been over the past two years and will remain for the foreseeable future as long as the income disparity and social inequities between Bangkok and the countryside - that exiled former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra exposed and manipulated to great success - continue to be ignored.
The 58-to-42 split among voters who polled will be seen as a firm victory by the military junta under the Council for National Security and its appointed government of Prime Minister Gen. Surayud Chulanont.
But the contrary is the case.
The ruling generals have shrugged off the significant rejection of the charter, insisting on putting the referendum outcome behind and moving towards the election.
While the pro-charter movement has hardly celebrated, the anti-charter groups have rejoiced. To them, the minority but substantial vote of disapproval is heartening in view of blatant military and government campaigns to pass the charter in the lead-up to the unprecedented plebiscite.
In the face of martial law in some areas and pro-charter lobbying campaigns from the military, bureaucrats and state-owned media, voters in the Northeast, the heartland of Mr Thaksin's former Thai Rak Thai party that stands for more than one-third of the electorate, still rejected the charter convincingly by more than 60%.
The northern region, also a Thaksin stronghold with one fifth of eligible voters, was almost evenly split, whereas the central and Bangkok metropolitan regions, respectively with one quarter and 10% of registered voters, were for the charter just as much as the Northeast was against.
The less populous South, the Democrat party's entrenched base, gave a resounding thumbs-up.
This outcome suggests that Thailand is regionalised, pitting the North and Northeast against the more well-to-do remainder of the country. It is also testimony to the staying power of Mr Thaksin and the TRT. Although Mr Thaksin has been in forced exile for almost a year, his TRT policy platform remains appealing to the rural poor who constitute the North and Northeast.
Many who voted to approve also wanted to "move on". Few voters have expressed explicit support for the actual contents of the charter, but many are inclined to be expedient as a way of proceeding to an elected government and hastening the CNS' departure.
For the CNS, the referendum clearly indicates unfinished business. No matter what the post-coup powers-that-be in the military, government, judiciary and other state agencies have done to him, Mr Thaksin and remnants of his overthrown regime just will not go away.
This includes the host of corruption charges, allegations of abuse of power, the constant character assassination, social disgrace campaigns on the airwaves and print media, and even a brief incarceration of his United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship ringleaders.
Indeed, Mr Thaksin has changed Thailand more than his opponents and enemies would care to admit. It is a shame for his loyal followers that he left such a long trail of alleged graft, conflicts of interest, and violations of power while in office.
Mr Thaksin's and the TRT's resilience at the referendum is likely to reinforce CNS leader General Sonthi Boonyaratkalin's intention to throw his hat into the electoral ring to see through his unfinished business.
The risks are just too high for the junta chief to enter his mandatory retirement next month and simply exit the political stage.
Gen Sonthi has everything to lose if he cannot exert some control over the post-election political environment.
Last Sunday's outcome also is likely to lead him to appoint the next Army chief based more on trust than ability and seniority.
At issue is how Gen Sonthi plans to engage in the muddy politics of Thai elections.
While he can enter the cabinet without being an MP, the road to the premiership - the top office that would allow him to call the shots - would require him to run in the election. The terrifying spectre of a coup leader transforming his post-coup undertakings into an elected premiership has already exacerbated political tensions.
For the political parties that are in the process of realignment, the split pattern of the referendum is likely to recur in the upcoming general election.
In a level-playing field, the People's Power party, the dissolved TRT's reincarnation, is expected to garner upwards to one third of the 480-member Lower House, based on the referendum results in the North and Northeast.
As election day approaches, the CNS and government are likely to do everything in their power to ensure the PPP is undermined and excluded from the post-election government.
A democratic system has emerged from Thai voters' collective approval of the 2007 charter. It harks back to the period between 1992 and 1997 prior to the promulgation of the more popular and reform-oriented 1997 constitution and before Mr Thaksin rose to power.
Owing to the deliberate recalibration of the distribution and exercise of power in the new constitution, Thai democracy in the near term will not just be "managed" but it will be in the direct custody of appointed senators, the judiciary and the ostensibly independent accountability-promoting agencies.
Together, this triangular concentration of unelected power will keep elected representatives in check and maintain overall oversight of the political landscape.
This custodial democracy will be bureaucracy-driven in the preservation and pursuit of interests of the Bangkok-based traditional elite, who oversaw Thailand for decades before Mr Thaksin came along.
The writer is Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.
Vocabulary (in discussion above)
Thitinan Pongsudhirak - a Thai political scientist and a Professor at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, also head of ISIS below (See Wikipedia)
Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS) - a center devoted to research on international relations and comparative politics in Southeast Asia located at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand
lingering - continuing to exist much longer than expected
myriad - large number of
unresolved - has not yet been solved, problem continues to exist
lie in the wake of - exists after a big event (the referendum) id finished
custody of x - the legal right to take care of person x and control their life (for example, the divorced mother was given custody of her child or after arrest he was held in custody)
custodian (noun) - the person having custody of x
custodial (adjective) - acting as a custodian
custodial democracy - democracy controlled by a small group of people
* direct custody of
discordant (adjective) - with disagreement
telling (adjective) - effective
a telling indicator - an effective indicator
a referendum - when the people of a country vote directly on policy (similar to "plebiscite" below)
turned it down - refused it, offered it but did not accept it
deeply polarised country - deeply divided society
for the foreseeable future - will continue for a long time
income disparity - income difference between poor and rich
social inequities - unfair treatment of poor people
exposed - made known to public
manipulated - used for his own benefit and gain
Council for National Security (CNS) - the military council that has governed Thailand after the coup, the junta
the contrary - the opposite
shrugged off - treat as not important or serious
a charter - a constitution, a formal document listing the goals, principles of governance of a group of people
* pro-charter movement
heartening - encouraging
blatant - open and very obvious (in a bad way)
a plebiscite - a direct vote on policy by the people of a country (similar to "referendum" above)
lead up to x - the period of time and activities before a big event
unprecedented - has never happened before
* the lead-up to the unprecedented plebiscite
martial law - strict military law
lobby for x - try to presuade the government to do x
lobbying campaigns - a long-term project of lobbying for certain goals
the electorate - the people who vote
eligible voters - people who meet the requirements for voting
entrenched - firmly established and difficult to change
* the Democrat party's entrenched base
give a thumbs up - give approval
gave a resounding thumbs-up - give strong approval
regionalised - divided up into separate regions (which can't agree or work together)
well-to-do - wealthy, has a lot of money
in forced exile - must live outside of the country but does not want to
policy platform - the set of policies that a poltician or political party campaigns with (to attract the loyalty of voters and get votes)
move on - move on to the next stage, don't get stuck in a rut, keep moving and developing
explicit - open and clear to see
inclined to - have a tendency to
expedient - a useful action to help the present situation (but not good morally or for the long-term)
hastening - make an event happen sooner and faster than normal
* hastening the CNS' departure
powers-that-be - the people or groups that currently hold political power
character assassination - attempting to destroy a person's reputation by attacking in an unfair and dishonest way
disgrace - lose respect, be dishonoured, be embarassed, have people disapprove of you
incarceration - in prison or jail
United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship ringleaders -
more than his opponents and enemies would care to admit -
alleged graft, conflicts of interest -
resilience - strength, ability to recover quickly from a disaster, not easily damaged (See glossary)
mandatory - required
mandatory retirement - required retirement
call the shots - make the decisions and control something
the spectre of x - x might happen and x is unpleasant
exacerbated - made problem even worse
People's Power Party (PPP) - the new Thai Rak Thai (TRT), the replacement party for the TRT, the political party that former TRT MPs moved to after the TRT was disbanded (See Wikipedia)
garner - get, obtain
undermined - weaken, make less strong than before (See glossary)
excluded - not include, prevent others from including
x harks back to y - x is similar to or modeled on y
promulgation of - made official, approved and made into law
recalibration of - changing of
* recalibration of the distribution and exercise of power in the new constitution
ostensibly - appears to be true or officially true (but may not actually be true)
independent - separate, not connected, not influenced by, not affected by
accountability - being responsible for one's actions and able to justify these actions (See glossary)
* ostensibly independent accountability-promoting agencies
keep elected representatives in check -
oversight - managing, making sure something works efficiently and meets its goals of operation
the Bangkok-based traditional elite - Bangkok has been the business and government center for over 200 years, during this long period wealth and power has become concetrated in Bangkok
Answer Key:
1. What did the referendum vote reveal about Thai society?
That so many people voted against the charter reveals that Thai society remains deeply divided.
2. Why is Thai society divided and what does this division have to do with Thaksin?
Thai society is divided (polarised) because of: a. income disparities, and b. social inequities.
Thaksin exposed and manipulated these divisions and built his political power on them.
3. What percentages of the vote were for and against the charter?
50% for the referendum.
42% against the referendum.
4. How do the anti-charter groups feel about the referendum vote?
They were encouraged ("heartened") by the vote they received,
especially they campaigned at a disadvantage.
5. What was the heartland of Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party?
What percentage of the electorate does it account for?
Did the referendum pass in this region?
The Northeast (Isan) is the heartland of the TRT.
It accounts for more than one third of the electorate.
It rejected the charter by more than 60%
6. What percentage of the electorate does the north account for?
What was the referendum vote like in the north?
The North accounts for 20% of the electorate.
The vote was evenly split between pro and anti-charter.
("...The northern region, also a Thaksin stronghold with one fifth of eligible voters, was almost evenly split,...")
7. What does the referendum vote reveal about the regional nature of Thai politics?
Thailand is regionalised poltically with the North and Northeast pitted against the more wealthy remainder of the country.
8. Does everyone who voted for the charter agree with the charter? Why or why not?
Many people who voted for the charter, voted for it because they wanted to "move on" to elections that may displace the military CNS from power.
("Many who voted to approve also wanted to "move on". Few voters have expressed explicit support for the actual contents of the charter, but many are inclined to be expedient as a way of proceeding to an elected government and hastening the CNS' departure.")
9. Why is it likely that General Sonthi will enter politics and try to get elected?
Sonthi enters mandatory retirement next month and risks losing everything he has gained recently if he "cannot exert some control over the post-election political environment."
10. What political party has effectively replaced Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party? What percentage of the vote is it projected to get in the next election?
The People's Power Party (PPP). This party is projected to get up to one third of the vote in the next election.
11. What recent period of Thai history does the post-2007 referendum period look like it will resemble?
The period after the 1991-92 coup and political turmoil but before the promulgation of the 1997 constitution, roughly from 1992 to 1997.
("A democratic system has emerged from Thai voters' collective approval of the 2007 charter. It harks back to the period between 1992 and 1997 prior to the promulgation of the more popular and reform-oriented 1997 constitution and before Mr Thaksin rose to power. ")
12. What is the "triangular concentration of unelected power" under the new charter? What effect will it likely have on governance under the new charter?
a. Appointed senators.
b. The Judiciary.
c. Government agencies (independent, accountability promoting)
It is likely to:
a. Keep elected representatives in check.
b. Maintain overall oversight of the political landscape.
13. What interests is the newly emergent democracy under the new charter likely to serve?
The newly emergent democracy is likely to serve the interests of the Bangkok-based traditional elite.
("This custodial democracy will be bureaucracy-driven in the preservation and pursuit of interests of the Bangkok-based traditional elite, who oversaw Thailand for decades before Mr Thaksin came along.
The vote was evenly split (50%-50%) in the north.")
