Thithinan Pongsudhirak on the "good" coup's failure
to achieve its objectives one year later
By Jon Fernquest[Introduction|Vocabulary|Article]
[Reading Questions|Answers]
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Dr. Thithinan Pongsudhirak of Chulalongkorn University provides an assessment of the coup regime's performance over the last year.
He starts out by considering whether the coup leaders met the very objectives and justifications for the coup that they set forth at the outset one year ago.
He looks at the stated aims of the coup leaders and their success in: 1. fighting Thaksin era corruption, 2. healing the great rural-urban divisions in Thai society, 3. freeing up government agencies and bureaucracy from Thai Rak Thai's political influence, and 4. finally in dealing with alleged insults to the monarchy.
Thithinan then broadens his assessment, first looking at the overall performance of the government over the last year and the effectiveness of their policies.
Finally, he looks at the logic and argument used to justify the coup in the first place.
Even if you don't agree with his overall negative assessment of the coup leaders' performance, Thithinan's systematic assessment of the issues is certainly worthy of emulation in any debate on these issues.
Check out previous Bangkok Post articles on the period from Shin sale to coup and beyond.
Reading Questions
Here are some questions to guide your reading (See answers at end):1. When Thithinan suggests we "view the coup through three lenses," what are the "three lenses" ?
(Must read the whole article first to answer this question)
2. What were the initial four justifications for the coup by the military:
(Must read the whole article first to answer this question)
3. What progress has the post-coup regime made in the goal of uncovering corruption?
4. Even if corruption is uncovered, why will some people still reject this evidence?
5. How have the generals responsible for the coup engaged in much the same corrupt acts they condemned in the Thaksin administration?
6. How could the coup regime have made more of an effort to heal the divisions (polarisation) within Thai society?
7. Are the permanent government bureaucracy and agencies any more independent under the coup regime?
8. Was Thaksin's alleged insult to the monarchy ever acted on in any way? Why?
(Express your opinion)
9. What was the two-pronged policy of the coup regime?
10. How was the logic behind the "good" coup flawed?
Bangkok Post Article September 18, 2007
FOCUS / FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE SEPT 19, 2006 COUPLittle good about the 'good' coup
However the military coup of Sept 19 is assessed on its first anniversary, a passing grade is hard to come byBy THITINAN PONGSUDHIRAK
In assessing the military coup on its first anniversary, one must say that the Sept 19, 2006 putsch has made advancements in unwarranted areas and limited headway on the many fronts it was designed to achieve.
On some of their stated objectives, the coup-makers have flatly failed. The coup has turned out to be much less than anticipated, its costs far outweighing its justifications.
assess - evaluate before making a judgement
a passing grade - successfully completed (a class at school)
is hard to come by - if hard to find
a putsch - a coup
unwarranted - no need or reason to do
make headway - make progress, successfully complete part of what you aimed to do
fronts - goals, objectives (a "front" in warfare is a boundary between your position and the enemy position)
flatly failed - failed entirely
anticipated - expected, what people thought would happen
x outweighting y - x greater than y
It is instructive to view the coup through three lenses.
The first is the benchmark which the ruling generals under the Council for National Security themselves set up. From the outset, their stated rationales were four-fold. Among these, only the issue of corruption has made noticeable progress.
That the ousted regime under former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra was corrupt is becoming indisputable in view of myriad indictments and outstanding arrest warrants against him and his family. However, the prosecutorial efforts against Mr Thaksin and his family have incurred extraordinary costs to the judicial system and the rule of law in Thailand.
The prosecution of Mr Thaksin has gone so far that it is seen by many as political persecution, subjugating the rule of law to the power of men. The unintended, disconcerting consequence is that justice has been made subservient to power.
Nevertheless, the CNS has succeeded in overthrowing Mr Thaksin and his monopolistic regime, and has seen to it through the Assets Scrutiny Committee, the Constitution Tribunal and other agencies that more than 60 billion baht of Mr Thaksin's family assets have been frozen and that his former Thai Rak Thai party has been disbanded, its leading executives banned from political office for five years.
a benchmark - a way of measuring of progress, a standard of comparison
the outset - the beginning
rationales - reasons (why something was done)
indisputable - can argue with, very certain
myriad - a very large number of
indictments - formal accusations of a crime being committed (to be acted upon by a court of law)
persecution - cruel and unfair treatment of a person or group because of their beliefs
subjugating - taking complete control of
rule of law - when laws (abstract principles) rather than the arbitrary whims of people in power rules the land
disconcerting - upsetting
a consequence - something that happens as a result of something else (x is a consequence of y)
x subservient to y - x does whatever y wants them to do
disbanded - when a group of people is broken up and ends
Yet despite the demonisation of Mr Thaksin, the Thaksin phenomenon lives on.
The referendum results last month showed resilient support by way of a solid rejection of the military-backed charter in the North and Northeast underlined the CNS' failure to wipe out Mr Thaksin and his associates from the political map.
On the other hand, the military junta itself has come under allegations of graft and nepotism. It has given itself salary raises, increased the Defence Ministry budget, and expanded personnel under the outdated communist-fighting Internal Security Operations Command (Isoc).
Four-star generals have taken over chairmanships of major state-owned-enterprises, with few results but plenty of controversies.
For their first explicit coup justification of Mr Thaksin's corruption, the CNS has had limited success as Mr Thaksin's regime is decapitated, much of his assets locked up, his personal incarceration in store, but his political legacy based on a patchy but popular pro-grassroots agenda is still very much intact.
At the same time, the generals have fallen into the same trap of alleged corruption and abuses of power, albeit to a lesser degree.
demonisation - made into a demon or a the bad guy (through a campaign in the media, for instance)
a phenomenon - something observed to exist, usually by a scientist (here Thaksin's sudden great popularity)
resilient - strong, renews strength easily after defeat
underlined - emphasised
wipe out - destroy completely
allegations - accusations, claims of wrongdoing
graft - corruption (using political power and authority for personal profit)
nepotism - using your power in government to favour your own family
decapitated - cut off head (end power completely)
explicit - shown clearly and openly
incarceration - putting in jail or prison
a legacy - what is left of what you did, after you have left
patchy - not complete
intact - still exists
albeit... - but...
Polarisation
Other coup rationales included Mr Thaksin's polarisation of Thai society and usurpation and manipulation of the bureaucracy, particularly the anti-graft agencies under the abolished 1997 constitution.
Political undercurrents over the past year, highlighted by the regionalised pattern of charter approval, have underscored Thailand's ongoing polarisation and fundamental conflict. The generals and their appointed interim government never made a genuine effort to bridge the deep divide between Mr Thaksin's supporters and opponents by conceding to the merits of - and adopting - some of the Thaksin government's policies that redressed neglected rural demands and expectations.
Instead, the CNS and government of Prime Minister General Surayud Chulanont brushed aside the upcountry anti-charter sentiments as ignorant vote sellers. On rectifying polarisation, the generals have utterly failed.
polarisation - split into two groups with very different goals and opinions
usurpation - seize power (when they have no right to do so)
manipulation - skilfully persuade people to do what you want (often through trickery)
undercurrents - generally held feelings that influence the way you think or act (but you are not aware of)
underscored - emphasised
conceding - admit unwillingly
brushed aside - dismissed, not accepted or even considered
sentiments - attitudes based on thoughts and feelings
rectifying - correcting
utterly - completely
Bureaucratic Manipulation
The bureaucracy and various independent agencies within it have swung from Mr Thaksin to the CNS. Just as they were lured and pressured to serve under Mr Thaksin, the bureaucrats, soldiers, judges and others under state payroll have become instruments to carry out the priorities, preferences and objectives of the military and interim government. Bureaucrats are hardly more autonomous under the CNS' watch.
That Mr Thaksin had acted in ways that may have insulted the monarchy was a charge the CNS never seriously pursued. For reasons that never entered the public domain, this charge was a non-starter from day one.
On all four counts of coup execution, the CNS has botched the first on corruption, failed the second on polarisation, usurped the third on bureaucratic manipulation, and dropped the last soon after seizing power.
lured - trick a person into coming to a place or doing something
instruments - tools (means for accomplishing ends)
autonomous - controls itself (rather than being controlled by someone else)
botched - done badly and unsuccessfully
National Reconciliation
A second way to gauge the coup after one year is broader. It centres on government performance. If the caretaker cabinet has been adept in meeting post-Thaksin public expectations, the coup might seem palatable for many. Effective governments tend to win the day even if their mandate is undemocratic.
But the Surayud government has been anything but effective.
Its stated two-pronged platform of national reconciliation and sufficiency economy has made little ground.
National reconciliation had two aims: addressing the wounds exposed by the year-long confrontation between pro- and anti-Thaksin forces that culminated with his ouster, and the Malay-Muslim insurgency in the southernmost border provinces. Reconciliation has not succeeded on either front, as polarisation continues and the southern violence worsens by the day, despite Gen Surayud's apology to southern Muslims early in his administration.
gauge - measure
caretaker - temporary government until a new one is elected
adept - skillful, doing with great skill
palatable - acceptable (eatable food)
mandate - authority to carry out a policy or task
two-pronged platform - they have two main policies
reconciliation - becoming friends again
wounds exposed - harm from the long conflict
culminated - happened at the end of a series of events
Sufficiency Economy
As a government policy plank, sufficiency economy has brought confusion and controversy, especially on capital controls and unresolved foreign business practices.
A lack of clear policy directions, underpinned by the government's sufficiency drive, has dampened growth prospects. The government's sufficiency emphasis has also run into the risks of hypocrisy. Prime Minister Surayud's more than 90 million baht in family assets has raised eyebrows, his land plot on a prime mountaintop not fully investigated.
Yet a third view of the coup might focus on its overall logic and argument.
This was supposed to be a "good coup". Thai democracy under Mr Thaksin was ill, monopolised and manipulated at will by the exiled premier and his cronies. Repairing Thailand's damaged democracy required its suspension until new rules could be instituted to return to a fuller, stronger democratic system.
policy plank - set of policies of a government or political party
unresolved - problem not solved yet
underpinned by - supported by
dampened - reduced
prospects - possibility of something happening
hypocrisy - say do one thing, do another
raised eyebrows - caused surprise
exiled - forced to live in another country
cronies - close friends of a powerful person who receive business favours
suspension - temporarily stopping for a period of time
institute rules - (formal) create rules
But the 2007 constitution is not going to enable such a return. The new charter features a half-appointed Senate, reduced powers for elected representatives and more authority for the unelected judiciary and independent agencies to safeguard the interests of the traditional elite comprising the bureaucracy, the military and the monarchy.
These new rules are elitist, and nowhere near the people's constitution of 1997.
The coup that was supposed to lead to a better democracy has been proven to be a myth. The past year in Thailand bears the chief lesson that there is no such thing as a go
safeguard - protect from harm
comprising - has as parts
elitist - serving elites in a society
Answer Key:
1. When Thithinan suggests we "view the coup through three lenses," what are the "three lenses" ?
(Must read the whole article first to answer this question)
a. Whether the coup generals achieved their own stated goals.
b. Government performance and policy effectiveness.
c. Overall logic and argument used to justify the coup.
2. What were the initial four justifications for the coup by the military:
(Must read the whole article first to answer this question)
a. Corruption.
c. Polarisation of Thai society.
d. Usurpation and manipulation of the bureaucracy.
d. Insult to the monarchy.
3. What progress has the post-coup regime made in the goal of uncovering corruption?
a. Many indictments and arrest warrants against Thaksin and family members that benefited from his regime have been issued (backed by uncovered evidence)
b. Thaksin's monopolistic regime has been overthrown.
c. More than 60 billion of Thaksin's assets have been frozen.
d. Thai Rak Thai has been disbanded and banned from politics for five years.
4. Even if corruption is uncovered, why will some people still reject this evidence?
a. Some will view it as political persecution.
b. Some will not view it as "rule of law" since it takes place outside the overthrown 1997 constitution.
5. How have the generals responsible for the coup engaged in much the same corrupt acts they condemned in the Thaksin administration?
a. They have given themselves salary raises.
b. Increased the military portion of the government budget.
c. Increased the size of ISOC (Internal Security Operations Command) left over from the era of fighting communism.
d. Taken over chairmanships of mjor state-owned enterprises.
6. How could the coup regime have made more of an effort to heal the divisions (polarisation) within Thai society?
They could have adopted some of Thaksin's populist policies directed towards the rural poor, modifying them to make them more transparent and accountable. Instead of seeking to improve this legacy, they rejected most of it.
7. Are the permanent government bureaucracy and agencies any more independent under the coup regime?
No.
8. Was Thaksin's alleged insult to the monarchy ever acted on in any way? Why?
(Express your opinion)
No, perhaps because His Majesty the King himself reverses any lese majeste cases every time they occur, perhaps because the evidence was too thin.
Most likely, because the monarchy is a sacred institution in Thai society that should not be brought into political arguments.
9. What was the two-pronged policy of the coup regime?
a. National reconciliation
i. Resolving theyear long conflict between pro- and anti-Thaksin forces that preceded the coup.
ii. Ending the insurgency in the south.
b. Sufficiency economy:
i. capital controls
ii. Foreign Business Act changes to eliminate nominee shareholding
10. How was the logic behind the "good" coup flawed?
Repairing damaged democracy supposedly "required its suspension until new rules could be instituted to return to a fuller, stronger democratic system," but the new 2007 constitution will not allow a return to such a "stronger democracy" because the constitution has been set up to favour the "interests of the traditional elite comprising the bureaucracy, the military and the monarchy," and not the people themselves.
