The art of the bloodless coup?
By Jon Fernquest[Introduction|Vocabulary|Article|Reading Questions|Answers]
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Today Dr. Thitinan Pongsudhirak continues his analysis of the 2006 Thai Coup.
The coup council, known as the CDRM, faces many challenges.
Dr. Thitinan outlines these challenges in what almost amounts to an art of the bloodless coup.
Dr. Thitinan is an expert on Thai politics at Chulalongkorn University and the director of the Institute of Security and International Studies at the university.
From 1998 to 2005 Dr. Thitinan was Thailand Country Analyst at the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) the business intelligence unit of The Economist.
Reading Questions
Here are some questions to guide your reading (See answers at end):1. Does the current peaceful situation mean that the CDRM has an easy job ahead of them?
2. Where might Thaksin still have support?
3. What led to Thaksin's great popularity over the past five years?
4. What must the CDRM strike a balance between?
5. By restricting freedoms, in what two ways will the CDRM control pro-Thaksin groups?
6. If the CDRM must restrict freedoms and civil liberties, in what manner must they do so?
7. What would be a nightmare scenario for the 2006 coup?
8. What must the military and people who oppose the coup avoid at all costs?
9. How can military and civil society groups act in a responsible fashion?
10. Is incarcerating members of Thaksin's inner circle legal?
11. What does incarcerating members of Thaksin's inner circle prevent?
12. What are the three purposes of corruption charges against Thaksin and his inner circle?
[Check back shortly for more]
Bangkok Post Article - September 26, 2006
Uphill struggle ahead for coup council
While the putsch has brought the intractable Thai political crisis to an abrupt end, the coup-makers face numerous challenges
By THITINAN PONGSUDHIRAK
The relative peace and calm that greeted Thailand's military coup on Sept 19 is less than meets the eye. Much danger is lurking underneath the veneer of post-coup stability, waiting to surface - unless the military rulers under the Council for Democratic Reform under Constitutional Monarchy (CDRM), can stamp their authority legitimately, and complete many tasks in the immediate days ahead.
The first thing the CDRM needs to do is consolidate control in view of ousted caretaker prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra's lingering support in the armed forces and the police, not to mention extensive pro-Thaksin elements nationwide who bought into his giddy populism over the past five years.
To maintain control, the CDRM has imposed restrictions on civil liberties and personal freedoms, to the disenchantment of civil society groups.
Caught between a rock and a hard place, the CDRM will have to perform a delicate balancing act to appease civil society but yet curtail freedoms sufficiently to keep pro-Thaksin columns from staging anti-coup protests or an outright counter coup.
On the one hand, civil society groups will increasingly voice their dissent at the suppression of freedoms of speech and assembly, demanding the restoration of basic civil liberties. On the other, pro-Thaksin supporters may rally for their overthrown leader if given sufficient freedom of movement and expression.
To navigate the murky post-coup aftermath on public freedom and the imperative to maintain control, the junta needs to exercise utmost patience and restraint. They need to communicate and compromise as much as possible. The nightmare for them would be an alignment of previous anti-Thaksin protesters and pro-Thaksin supporters against the coup. This dangerous scenario may tempt the CDRM to act in a fashion not seen since October 1976, when a right-wing backlash gruesomely crushed left-wing students.
Both the prospective protesters and the military must not get themselves caught in the self-fulfilling quicksand of violent confrontation. The military needs to abide by its timetable to handover power to an acceptable civilian caretaker government, whereas civil society groups should stand back as long as the CDRM sticks to its pledges.
Second, the council has to deal with Mr Thaksin's inner circle, several of whom have been detained. Incarcerating them has no legal basis, but letting them go risks agitation and revival of a pro-Thaksin movement. The council is likely to erect a wall of corruption charges that have hounded Mr Thaksin and his cronies for months. These charges will dually help justify the coup, forestall Mr Thaksin's comeback, and keep his cadres on the back foot.
But weeding out Mr Thaksin's cronies is difficult in the absence of clear-cut parameters. Mr Thaksin's inner circle should certainly be dealt with in a swift judicial fashion, and none of Mr Thaksin cadres should be given a new lease of life, as two legal experts have apparently enjoyed.
Yet the prosecution of Mr Thaksin's long trail of corruption and abuses of power facilitated by his lieutenants and associates is more controversial the farther it extends from Mr Thaksin's inner sanctum of advisers, ministers and henchmen.
Drawing the lines of prosecution is a tough task the council must perform judiciously and legitimately.
Third, the ruling junta needs to hand over power to a civilian government expeditiously, led by the appointment of an internationally acceptable and credible prime minister, who should have a clean record, administrative experience, and domestic stature, with unquestionable expertise.
The CDRM should do so quickly and put a stop to the current speculation for the caretaker prime minister, to avoid politicisation.
That an appointed prime minister is not yet in place already reflects poorly on the CDRM for its lack of preparation. Whether the interim leader be an expert in law or economics is less important now than a decisive appointment. It would show that the council is trying to be earnest and resolute, that it knows what it is doing.
Moreover, the widely acceptable interim government must be given sufficient autonomy not to be seen as a puppet. The military naturally will want to be in charge of the security-related defence and interior portfolios. The latitude for appointing the rest of the cabinet, however, should rest with the caretaker prime minister.
Finally, the appointed interim government together with the military must ensure a credible, legitimate and effective Constitution drafting process.
It must come up with a clear election timetable, which is not too long in view of restless Thais who want to have a say over the long crisis that culminated with the coup, but long enough to put in place a workable new Constitution that is an improvement on the preceding charter.
While it moves ahead to clean up Thailand's democratic slate, the CDRM will be pressed by all sides, including some of the former anti-Thaksin demonstrators who are now anti-coup.
It is equally imperative for the men-in-uniform not to overreact to civil society rumblings as to keep the pro-Thaksin remnants at bay. It behooves them to stand back as soon as they come up with a competent and credible interim government.
Missteps by the CDRM could lead to political cataclysm that ends in violence and tears.
The writer is Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.
Vocabulary
putsch - a sudden attempt to takeover the government by force
less than meets the eye - when you look at it, it looks like a lot, but it isn't
lurking - waiting secretly
Council for Democratic Reform under Constitutional Monarchy (CDRM) - the full name of the coup council that controls the government after the coup
legitmate - has political legitimacy, meaning that the public respects it as a rightful government (the sociologist Max Weber held that there were three sources for political legitimacy:
a. Charismatic authority: "Legitimacy based on the charisma of the leader, often partly based on the perception that this leader has certain supernatural attributes. Example: a tribal chieftain."See Wikipedia on political legitimacy)b. Traditional authority: "Legitimacy based on tradition; e.g., people accept the government for the simple fact that it has been around for so long. Example: a monarchy."
c. Rational/legal authority: "Legitimacy based on the perception that a government's powers are derived from set procedures, principles, and laws. Example: representative democracy."
stamp their authority legitimately - a metaphor, like a rubber stamp on a document, shows the public that they have legitimate authority
consolidate control - strengthen and unify in order to control
lingering - disappearing only slowly
giddy - feeling dizzy, unsteady like you are about to fall over and faint
populism - promoting the interests of ordinary people (political ideas and activities that claim to do this, but may not) (See Wikipedia on Populism)
civil liberties - rights to say, do, and think freely (without violating the rights of others) (See Wikipedia on civil liberties)
caught between a rock and a hard place - in a difficult situation with difficult decisions
a delicate balancing act - great care needed in making decisions (to balance opposing forces)
appease - prevent anger by giving someone what they want
curtail freedoms - reduce or limit freedoms
a counter-coup - a second coup that seizes power of the government from the first coup makers
civil society - all the voluntary organizations and institutions in society such as NGOs, community organisations, clubs, unions, policy institutes, think tanks, environmental groups, not the force-backed structures of the government (See Wikipedia on civil society)
dissent - strong disagreement with a view held by most people (a majority view)
suppression - preventing an activity like a protest from happening by law or force
murky - not clear, difficult to understand very well
restraint - limits on action
a compromise - give up something to reach an agreement
a scenario - one possible future development or situation
a backlash - a sudden strong reaction against something by society
gruesomely - very unpleasantly and shockingly
self-fulfilling - when something that is said or believed becomes true merely because people believed that it would
quicksand - deep wet sand that you sink into and can't get out of when you walk into it (looks like mud, often seen in the movies with people dieing when they step in it)
confrontation - argument, fight, or battle
abide by - follow, comply with
inner circle - small group of people close to an important person who have special powers and information
incarcerating - keeping in jail, house arrest, not allowing someone to move around freely (this word is more abstract so it could mean house arrest, unlike jail with an image of a dirty cell with steel bars in front)
agitation - protesting or organising people politically
cronies - business friends of a politician who gain from their friendship
a comeback - a return to power
weeding out - finding the bad ones and getting rid of them (like pulling weeds out of a lawn and leaving the healthy grass)
clear-cut parameters - clear rules and procedures
cadres - a small special group of devoted followers working for a special purpose (in communist China under Mao this word was used frequently)
a new lease of life - a return to power, someone who is no longer participating in politics after the coup because they were a Thaksin supporter is allowed to participate once again
a long trail of - a long record of
the inner sanctum - a secret and very private place
henchmen - people who do unpleasant or criminal things for someone else
expeditiously - quickly and efficiently
credible - believable
a clean record - has committed no crimes, has done no bad things that people know about
domestic stature - importance within the country (versus international stature which means importance outside the country)
expertise - skill and knowledge from study and work experience
politicisation - making something political that isn't usually political
interim - temporary
resolute - determined, not wavering
autonomy - freedom from outside influence, when a group can make their own decisions without being controlled by outsiders
a puppet - a ruler without power (controlled by someone else)
portfolios - duties and responsibilities of a minister or government official
latitude for - freedom and authority to act (latitude is width, so you can think of a very wide space to move around in)
a charter - a short preliminary constitution, a formal document describing the rights and principles of an organisation
men-in-uniform - soldiers
to keep at bay - to prevent them from acting
behooves him to... - he should...
a cataclysm - a disaster (an event that causes great change and harm)
Answer Key:
1. Does the current peaceful situation mean that the CDRM has an easy job ahead of them?
No, although they are not visible, there are many potential dangers that the CDRM must deal with.
("less than meets the eye. Much danger is lurking underneath the veneer of post-coup stability, waiting to surface")
2. Where might Thaksin still have support?
In the military, police, and pro-Thaksin groups all over the country.
3. What led to Thaksin's great popularity over the past five years?
His populist policies. ("giddy populism")
4. What must the CDRM strike a balance between?
They have to balance 1. freedom and civil liberties with 2. control of pro-Thaksin groups that want ot make a comeback.
5. By restricting freedoms, in what two ways will the CDRM control pro-Thaksin groups?
They will prevent pro-Thaksin groups from 1. staging anti-coup protests, and 2. staging a counter-coup
6. If the CDRM must restrict freedoms and civil liberties, in what manner must they do so?
The CDRM must use "patience and restraint" and "communicate and compromise as much as possible."
7. What would be a nightmare scenario for the 2006 coup?
If both pro- and anti- Thaksin groups allied themselves against the CDRM and the CDRM used violence to repress them repeating what happened in October 1976.
8. What must the military and people who oppose the coup avoid at all costs?
Violent confrontation.
9. How can military and civil society groups act in a responsible fashion?
a. "The military needs to abide by its timetable to handover power to an acceptable civilian caretaker government."
b. "Civil society groups should stand back as long as the CDRM sticks to its pledges."
10. Is incarcerating members of Thaksin's inner circle legal?
No.
11. What does incarcerating members of Thaksin's inner circle prevent?
It prevents them from organising protests ("agitation") and reviving pro-Thaksin sentiment among the people.
12. What are the three purposes of corruption charges against Thaksin and his inner circle?
a. They justify the coup.
b. They prevent a Thaksin comeback.
c. They weaken his supporters (by forcing them to spend all their time dealing with the corruption charges),
("keep his cadres on the back foot").
[Check back shortly for more]
