The Bangkok New Years Bombings: Why? (04-01-07)
By Jon Fernquest[Introduction|Vocabulary|Article]
[Reading Questions|Answers]
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One can read the details of the Bangkok New Years bombings and still not understand how they fit into the big picture of what is happening in Thai politics right now as a new year begins.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak's analysis of Thai politics today remedys this.
"Where is all of this leading?" is the question it naturally raises.
If international financial and tourism markets are so sensitive to events like this, doesn't this add further support for the self-reliance of the self-sufficiency economy?
Reading Questions
Here are some questions to guide your reading (See answers at end):1. Has Thai military intelligence and police forensics been of a high standard recently? What consequences will this have for investigations into the bombings?
2. What has the impact of the bombings on the post-coup adminstration?
3. What was the original purpose of the coup, according to the author?
4. What are the two contending explanations of who orchestrated the coup? What are the arguments for and against these explanations? (Summarise and state concisely)
5. What prior history makes Thaksin's "flat denial" less believable?
Bangkok Post Article: January 3, 2007
ANALYSIS / THAI POLITICSObjective clear, identity murky
While the objective of the multiple bomb blasts on New Year's Eve was clearly to undermine the authority of the CNS and the government, the identity of the perpetrators remains in the shadows By THITINAN PONGSUDHIRAKOwing to poor intelligence and dismal forensics in the army and the police, we may never know the real culprits of Bangkok's unprecedented bomb explosions on New Year's Eve that have so far claimed three lives and injured scores of innocent bystanders. Nevertheless, far-reaching political ramifications have already emerged. The bomb blasts have undermined the legitimacy and credibility of both the military junta under the Council for National Security and its appointed interim government led by General Surayud Chulanont.
As Thailand is virtually under military rule following the CNS coup on Sept 19, the bombs in Bangkok were a slap in the face of the generals.
Having seized power by force and imposed martial law, which is still in place in most parts of the country, the CNS appears inept for its inability to maintain security and public safety in central Bangkok, where thousands of revellers were ushering in the New Year.
In the same vein, the bomb blasts have discredited the Surayud government. It had already suffered a series of policy setbacks, from the failed legalisation of the underground lottery and lenient treatment of assets belonging to the family of ousted prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, to the recent controversial exchange rate management involving capital controls to stem the baht's appreciation, the Surayud cabinet now appears embattled.
It has lost its technocratic touch, and is now facing security and safety challenges in the heart of the capital.
If the CNS is unable to provide security to Bangkok residents and the Surayud cabinet is incapable of mustering the technocratic wherewithal to steer Thailand's macro-economy smoothly forward, the merits of the coup itself must now come into question.
This coup was supposed to sideline the usurpers of Thai democracy and remedy its flaws before re-launching a stronger democratic system with a new constitution and a general election.
In view of the Bangkok bombs, the return to democratic rule seems more problematic, with a potential delay. Although they are preoccupied with shoring up their credibility, the ruling generals should come out to reassure the public that Thailand's democratic roadmap remains on course.
While the perpetrators of the bomb explosions have achieved their intended effects of destabilising the Surayud government and undermining the CNS, their identity has been a subject of wild speculation.
Two contending explanations have been proferred, putting aside pet conspiracy theories.
Fingers were quickly pointed to the southern Malay-Muslim insurgency in the immediate aftermath of the bomb attacks. The well-coordinated blasts were reminiscent of similar operations seen in the southernmost border provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat over the past three years since the separatist insurgency reappeared with growing frequency and potency. The southern insurgents may have simply expanded their areas of operation to the capital, bringing their fight to the seat of power.
But the plausibility of this explanation dissipated as hours turned into days, for several reasons. First, the Malay-Muslim insurgents have shown little indication or inclination to widen their base of operations beyond the deep South, where they have benefited from inherent advantages in language, culture, customs and terrain. Having claimed more than 1,900 lives, the violence they have inflicted at will has been confined to the southernmost border provinces.
Second, the operational, logistical, organisational and financial requirements to conduct a near-simultaneous, coordinated bombing campaign in nine Bangkok areas at their most bustling time of the year, appear beyond the current capacity of the insurgents.
They would have had to rely on a tightly-knit and extensive network of contacts, informants and operatives based in Bangkok. The potential for information leakage, betrayal, unintended exposure and discovery by government security forces is immense.
It would just be too big of a leap for the insurgents to replicate en masse what they can now perpetrate with relative ease in areas under their familiarity and influence, to alien vicinities in the capital where they do not have a natural base of support.
Finally, and most important, the insurgents have not claimed credit for the Bangkok bomb attacks. The various separatist groups comprising the southern insurgency normally do not lay claim to the violence committed in the deep South, but they do not need to. Their culpability is common knowledge. But culpability in the Bangkok bombs may be assigned to other suspected groups and individuals if the insurgents remained quiet.
That the southern insurgents would have carried out the bomb attacks in Bangkok without claiming credit for political purposes, just does not make sense.
In a process of elimination, this leaves culpability to disaffected elements whose vested interests are to destabilise the government and make a laughing stock of the CNS. Prime Minister Surayud has prematurely alluded to the political forces who lost power in the Sept 19 putsch.
This implicit accusation has been greeted by a strongly- and carefully-worded denial from Mr Thaksin, the deposed premier.
But the logic and recent pattern of political developments lend some credence to the explanation that vested interests associated with the ousted regime were behind the bombs.
First, the post-coup developments have been marked by destabilising but unidentified forces who have torched dozens of state schools all over the country. The entry of General Chavalit Yongchaiyuth, a former prime minister, into the fray as a potential next leader of the Thaksin-founded Thai Rak Thai party and his allegation (later proved unfounded) of Prime Minister Surayud's illegal train carriages at a personal mountain residential resort, thickened the plot leading to the bombs.
Concurrently, news was leaked that Gen Sonthi Boonyaratkalin, the lead coup-maker in the CNS, may have two wives in contravention of Thai law.
Just a few days before the bombs, Mr Thaksin stepped up his rhetorical offensive through his lawyer, indicating that he wants to come back to fight the charges against him. The longer he is kept out of Thailand, the more marginalised he will become.
Mr Thaksin may not have had anything to do with the Bangkok bombs, as he insisted in his people-centred handwritten letter.
His flat denial, however, should be taken with a grain of salt. Mr Thaksin has sworn many times in the past about the things that he did and did not do, and many of them turned out contrary to his claims. His chief and most memorable line was his unawareness of his and his wife's assets having been registered under the names of his driver and servant - an insistence he made in the Constitution Court, no less. By his own doing, Mr Thaksin's words have at times been worth less than the paper they were written on.
Whatever the eventual findings behind the bomb attacks, Bangkok has now entered into an uncharted territory of instability. Threats of and actual bomb attacks may well be the norm in the weeks to come, as the political temperature rises inexorably.
Ultimately, the perpetrators' aim may be to make Thailand ungovernable and to indirectly sap the country's macro-economic well-being.
The CNS generals will want to blame many, as Bangkok comes into the grips of instability and volatility. But the ruling generals must not forget to blame themselves. They took power by force, and could have set things on a sounder footing with greater decisiveness. Their kid-glove treatment of the former regime and weak post-coup management, characterised by a lacklustre caretaker cabinet, have unwittingly facilitated the bomb blasts. Their bungled coup has come back to haunt them. Having got us into this mess, the onus is on the CNS to navigate a way out of the new, unfolding round of political crisis and confrontation.
The writer is Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.
Vocabulary
murky identity - not clear who it is, lacking details, difficult to understand
intelligence - in warfare the gathering and analysis of information about the enemy (See Wikipedia on military intelligence
dismal - bad in a sad or depressing way
forensics - the use of science to provide evidence in legal cases (See Wikipedia)
culprits - those guilty of a crime
unprecedented - never happened before
bystanders - people who saw an event (but were not involved in the event)
ramifications - the effects of a decision or an event
undermined - someone's position and authority is made less secure (by indirect means)
martial law - the laws in effect when the military controls the administration of justice (for example after a coup)
inept - unskilled, clumsy (don't know what they're doing)
revellers - people enjoying themselves in a noisy way (for example because they are drunk)
ushering in x - introducing the beginning of x
in the same vein - in the same style or manner
discredited - lose the respect and trust of others
policy setbacks - delays in making a policy work (in implementing a policy)
underground lottery - illegal and secret lottery
lenient treatment - treatment that is less severe and strict than expected
technocrat - a person who believes that technology and economics in coordination with regulated markets is the key to governance
technocratic - what technocrats do (adjective form of "technocrat")
mustering - gathering together resources before you do something (for example the general mustered together his troops before the attack)
wherewithal - having the resources necessary to do something (for example have enough money to do something)
perpetrators - the people who did the bad thing or crime
speculation - make guesses about some uncertain thing (for example speculate about who did the bombings)
proferred - offered to someone
a pet theory - a personal theory about why something happened
conspiracy theory - an explanation of a political event as a secret and deceptive plot by powerful people. This phrase is negative and used to dismiss a theory as not worth listening to (Many conspiracy theories claim that major events in history have been dominated by conspirators who manipulate political happenings from behind the scenes.) (See Wikipedia on conspiracy theories)
an insurgency - an armed rebellion against a government (See Wikipedia)
reminiscent of x - makes one think of or remember x
plausibility - possibility, could have happened
to dissipate - to become less and less strong until it goes away completely
inclination - tendency
show little inclination to do x - don't do x often
a base of operations - the place where military operations and attacks are planned and lauched from
logistical - organising something complicated (like a coup or a big public event)
tightly-knit - when the people in a group are linked together closely by shared family or interests
informants - people who give the police information about who committed a crime
an information leakage - when someone in an organisation makes private information public
replicate - copy, duplicate
en masse - in large numbers
perpetrate, perpetrators - to do something bad (like a crime)
the x comprising y - the parts x of y
culpability - guilt (for example for a crime)
disaffected elements - people who no longer support something because of problems
make a laughing stock of x - make x look ridiculous in the eyes of other people
alluded to x - mentioned x (in an indirect way)
deposed - fall from power, have political leadership taken away
vested interests - people who have a special personal interest in the outcome of an event
enter into the fray - enter into the mass of soldiers fighting during a battle
thickened the plot - the story becomes more complicated (before being resolved in the end)
in contravention of a law - violated a law
stepped up - increased activity, made more intense
a flat denial - to say that an accusation is completely false
taken with a grain of salt - to not believe something completely
inexorably - moving and cannot be stopped (cannot be prevented from continuing or progressing)
set things on a sounder footing - make things work more reliably
kid gloves - gloves made of very soft and smooth leather
to treat someone with kid-gloves - to deal with someone very gently or carefully
lacklustre - not energetic or very exciting (for example "a lacklustre performance")
unwittingly - doing something or being involved in something without knowing it
the onus is on x to y - x has a duty or responsibility to do y
Answer Key:
1. Has Thai military intelligence and police forensics been of a high standard recently? What consequences will this have for investigations into the bombings?
Military intelligence and police forensics has not been of a high standard. This means that we may never know who really orchestrated the bombings.
("Owing to poor intelligence and dismal forensics in the army and the police, we may never know the real culprits of Bangkok's unprecedented bomb explosions on New Year's Eve.")
2. What has the impact of the bombings on the post-coup adminstration?
The bombings have further "undermined the legitimacy and credibility" of the post-coup administration.
The administration is "now facing security and safety challenges in the heart of the capital."
3. What was the original purpose of the coup, according to the author?
The purpose of the coup was to "sideline the usurpers of Thai democracy and remedy its flaws before re-launching a stronger democratic system with a new constitution and a general election."
4. What are the two contending explanations of who orchestrated the coup? What are the arguments for and against these explanations? (Summarise and state concisely)
a. The southern Malay-Muslim insurgents:
For: The Bangkok bombings are similar to well-coordinated bombings in the south.
Against: Bombings have been confined to southern provinces. The Bangkok bombings seem to beyond the southern insurgents organisational and financial capabilities. The southern isurgents have also not claimed responsibility for the bombings. Why would they attack and then want to have someone else blamed for it?
b. Political forces who lost power in the coup:
For: The bombings have further destroyed the post-coup administration's image and made governance more difficult. Other unidentified forces have burned down schools all over the country. The bombings also fit a recent pattern of efforts to discredit the post-coup adminstration. As the author observes:
"Ultimately, the perpetrators' aim may be to make Thailand ungovernable and to indirectly sap the country's macro-economic well-being."
Against: Prime Minister Surayud made this accusation a little too quickly right after the bombings, before a detailed investigation had been made. Other factions in the military who lost power in the coup might be trying to reassert themselves.
5. What prior history makes Thaksin's "flat denial" less believable?
Thaksin has not always told the truth. As the author observes:
"Mr Thaksin has sworn many times in the past about the things that he did and did not do, and many of them turned out contrary to his claims. His chief and most memorable line was his unawareness of his and his wife's assets having been registered under the names of his driver and servant - an insistence he made in the Constitution Court, no less."
